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In this paper, we propose a new explanation for the recent increase in CEO pay at US 
firms. Our explanation, which is based on asymmetric information in financial markets, is 
motivated by a recent observation made by former DuPont CEO Edward S. Woolard, Jr.: 
“ The main reason (CEO) compensation increases every year is that most boards want their 
CEO to be in the top half of the CEO peer group, because they think it makes the company 
look strong. So when Tom, Dick, and Harry receive compensation increases in 2002, I get 
one too, even if I had a bad year.... (This leads to an) upward spiral” (Elson, 2003).
We present a game-theoretic model of this phenomenon, which is known in the business 
press as the “ Lake Wobegon Effect.” Our model has three key features: (i) there is 
asymmetric information regarding the manager’s ability to create value at the firm; (ii) the 
pay package given to the manager must convey information about the manager’s ability to 
create value at the firm; and, (iii) the firm must have some preference for favorably affecting 
outsiders’ perceptions of firm value. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this 
model, identify conditions under which pay is distorted upward relative to a full-information 
benchmark, and then embed our model in a simple assortative matching framework.
Our analysis offers a potential explanation across-country differences in CEO pay growth, 
and suggests that greater shareholder involvement in the pay process may be 
counterproductive.
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1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
CEO pay levels in the US have risen ten times as fast as average worker wages since the 
1970s (The Economist, 2006). These ever-increasing paychecks continue to attract the attention 
of policymakers, the media, and the public. One much-discussed potential cause for the increase 
in CEO pay has come to be known as the Lake Wobegon Effect. In public radio host Garrison 
Keillor’s mythical hometown of Lake Wobegon, Minnesota, all the children are above average. 
And so it is claimed with CEOs — no firm wants to admit to having a CEO who is below 
average, and so each firm wants its CEO’s pay package to put him at or above the median 
pay level for comparable firms. Of course, not every CEO can be paid more than average, 
and so (it is claimed) we see ever-increasing levels of CEO pay. The reasoning behind this 
effect was perhaps best summarized by former DuPont CEO Edward S. Woolard, Jr., speaking 
at a 2002 Harvard Business School roundtable on CEO pay (Elson, 2003): “The main reason 
compensation increases every year is that most boards want their CEO to be in the top half 
of the CEO peer group, because they think it makes the company look strong. So when Tom, 
Dick, and Harry receive compensation increases in 2002, I get one too, even if I had a bad 
year.... (This leads to an) upward spiral.”
A remarkable range of commentators have referenced the Lake Wobegon Effect in discussing 
CEO pay, including consultant turned pay-critic Graef Crystal (The Washington Post, 2002), 
former Harvard Business School dean Kim Clark (2003, 2006), and the director of the SEC’s 
Division of Corporation Finance, Alan Beller (2004). The Effect has even been cited by dis­
gruntled shareholders in picking proxy fights with management over pay levels. After Business 
Week ranked Alcoa worst nationally in the relation between CEO pay and stock price perfor­
mance, The Catholic Funds introduced a shareholder resolution citing the Lake Wobegon Effect 
and instructing the board to review the firm’s pay practices. The resolution failed.
As it is discussed in the business press, the Lake Wobegon Effect appears to rely on three key 
assumptions. First, there must be asymmetric information regarding the manager’s ability to 
create value at the firm. Second, the pay package given to a manager must convey information 
about the manager’s ability to create value at the firm. Third, the firm must have some 
preference for favorably affecting outsiders’ perceptions of firm value. The business-press level 
discussion of the Lake Wobegon Effect appears to recognize each of these points, and then simply 
assert that firms will distort pay levels upward away from the level that would be selected in 
the absence of the information asymmetry.
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In this paper, we develop several game-theoretic models of CEO contracting, each of which 
incorporates the three key assumptions of the Lake Wobegon Effect. 1 Specifically, we study a 
firm and a manager who privately observe a parameter that affects the productivity of their 
match. Stock market participants cannot observe this parameter, but attempt to infer it from 
observing the manager’s wage. The firm maximizes a weighted sum of short-run and terminal 
firm value, and so may wish to distort the publicly observable wage contract in order to affect 
the market’s beliefs regarding firm value.
We apply the standard tools of information economics to study this setting, and report three 
main results. First, we show that when firms have a sufficiently strong preference for high- 
short-run share prices, managerial pay can be distorted upward relative to a full-information 
benchmark. If the firm has a very strong preference for high short-run share prices, or if 
the manager captures a small share of the match surplus under full information, then the 
temptation to distort pay upward is stronger. Notably, however, the three key assumptions of 
the Lake Wobegon Effect are not sufficient to guarantee upward distortions in pay. Second, we 
find that the temptation to distort pay upward is stronger when the information asymmetry 
pertains to characteristics of the firm rather than characteristics of the manager. When the 
manager’s ability is uncertain, increases in the manager’s pay do boost the market’s assessment 
of managerial ability; however, the manager — not the firm — captures rents associated with 
increases in managerial ability. Thus, the marginal increase in firm value associated with a 
dollar increase in managerial pay is low when the uncertainty pertains to a characteristic of 
the manager. Third, embedding our basic model in a simple model of assortative matching 
suggests that CEO pay at large firms can be affected by short-termism at small firms.
Our analysis yields implications both for empirical research on CEO pay and for policy. 
First, our findings may offer a path to explaining across-country patterns in CEO pay. As 
many observers have noted, growth in US CEO pay has far outstripped that of most other 
developed nations in recent years. Our analysis, which relies on asymmetric information in 
financial markets, suggests that one potential source of across-country differences in pay is 
across-country differences in financial markets. Specifically, suppose that small US firms are 
subject to greater short-termist market pressures than comparable firms in other countries. 
These firms may then distort CEO pay upward relative to a full-information benchmark, which,
1O th e r w ork in  econom ics stud ies a Lake W obegon Effect in  em ployee evaluations, w here supervisors are 
unw illing to  ra te  employees honestly  and  th u s m ark  everyone as above average. See M oran  and  M organ  (2001) 
and  M acLeod (2003).
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as suggested by our assortative matching model, can lead to increases in CEO pay at larger 
firms.
Second, our analysis yields markedly different policy implications compared to other theories 
of recent CEO pay increases. Among other candidate theories for recent pay increases are fail­
ures in corporate governance, problems arising from the accounting treatment of stock options, 
and simple increases in demand for CEO talent. The governance-failure explanation, most re­
cently articulated by Bebchuk and Fried (2003), holds that CEOs control the pay process, and 
are thus able to enrich themselves at shareholder expense. The option-accounting explanation, 
discussed by Hall and Murphy (2003), suggests that the favorable accounting treatment of stock 
options is at least partly responsible for recent CEO pay increases. Market-driven increases in 
pay may arise from economy-wide increases in the return to skill (Kaplan and Rauh, 2006), or 
from changes in the size distribution of firms that affect the returns to CEO skill (Gabaix and 
Landier, 2006).2
The Lake Wobegon Effect is similar to the governance and option-accounting explanations 
in that the level of CEO pay differs from that expected under a full-information or no-agency- 
problem ideal. However, the Lake Wobegon Effect suggests a very different cause of the rise 
in pay. Under the governance and accounting theories, the problem stems from an intra- 
organizational agency problem. Motivating boards to take closer account of shareholder inter­
ests may well lead to reductions in pay under the governance or accounting explanations, but 
are likely to exacerbate the problem identified in our model. Our model suggests that allowing 
shareholders to delegate pay decisions to board members whose preferences differ from those of 
shareholders (as in Fershtman and Judd, 1987, or Dybvig and Zender, 1991) may help restrain 
pay levels.
Discussions of the Lake Wobegon Effect often include mention of the effects of peer-group 
comparisons on CEO pay. (See Bizjak et al., 2003 for an empirical analysis of this practice.) 
The fact that pay for a given CEO would be positively related to pay at comparable firms is, of 
course, consistent with well functioning managerial labor markets. Further, as Crystal (1991) 
has noted, strategic choice of peer groups can artificially inflate pay (so long as directors are 
unable or unwilling to “undo” these strategies). We argue, however, that the quotations from 
Woolard and others suggest forces beyond well functioning labor market and strategic choice of 
peer groups are at work. Specifically, these observers allege that firms want to pay at the top
2 See L azear and  O yer (2007) for a richer sum m ary  of recent research  on th e  level of C EO  pay.
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end of a peer group, even if that peer group is chosen non-strategically, and even if doing so is 
not necessitated by direct labor market competition. While the single-firm model we develop 
does not speak directly to the question of why firms would want to pay well relative to peers, 
it does offer a justification for the practice of paying well relative to some market expectation 
of pay, in an attempt, as Woolard puts it, to “look strong.”
2 M odel Outline
We consider a single-period game with four dates, as depicted in Figure 1. At date 1, the firm is 
matched with a potential manager. The firm and potential manager costlessly learn manager- 
and firm-specific productivity parameters, and a match-specific productivity parameter. We 
denote the manager- and firm-specific productivity parameters as q € [qL , qH] and a € [aL ,aH] 
for the firm and manager respectively. Let the match-specific productivity be given by f  (q, a; y), 
where 7  € [yl , YH] is a match-specific productivity parameter. Note the manager- and firm- 
specific productivity parameters may affect both the parties’ outside options and the value they 
split if they enter into an employment relationship and work together. We therefore interpret 
the manager’s productivity parameter a as a measure of general-purpose skill or ability. We 
can interpret the firm-specific productivity parameter as some measure of the firm’s technology 
or investment opportunities.
If employment is efficient, the firm and manager negotiate an employment contract at date 
2. We ignore moral hazard on the part of the manager, and so the employment contract simply 
consists of a wage w. We assume the terms of this wage contract are publicly observable. If 
employment is inefficient, then the parties separate, receive their reservation values, and the 
game ends.
At date 3, a round of trading in the firm’s shares occurs. The value of the firm’s shares is 
conditioned on the date 2 contract between the firm and manager. However, this market value 
cannot be conditioned (directly) on the value of the firm, because this is observed only by the 
firm and the manager. Instead, stock market participants form beliefs about the value of the 
firm based on the observed date 2  contract. At date 4, production occurs. Wages are paid to 
the manager, and residual profits are paid to shareholders. The game ends.
We build in the three key assumptions of the Lake Wobegon Effect as follows. First, we 
assume that some aspect of productivity — one of the match-specific productivity, the manager- 
specific productivity, or the firm-specific productivity — are not observed by market partici-
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Date 1: Date 2: Date 3: Date 4:
Matching Contracting Trading Production
Figure 1: Timeline.
pants. Thus, there is asymmetric information about firm value.
Second, we assume that the manager has sufficient bargaining power to capture some part 
of the rent resulting from the match. This implies that contract terms will vary with the value 
of the firm, and thus that stock-market participants will condition their beliefs about firm value 
on the payment made to the manager.
Third, we assume that the firm has a some preference for a high share price at date 3. Many 
justifications for the assumption of corporate short-termism or myopia have been proposed in 
the literature. Miller and Rock (1985), for example, assume that shareholders have exogenously 
differing time horizons. In their model, shareholders are ex ante identical, and learn their 
specific time horizons after the firm’s dividend policy is chosen; thus, all shareholders have 
some preference for high share prices in the short run. In Stein (1988), a corporate raider 
considers purchasing all of the firm’s shares immediately after a corporate action is taken, 
but before the terminal payoff. The expected payoff to current shareholders is therefore the 
weighted sum of short-term share price and terminal value, with the weights determined by the 
probability of a takeover. In our analysis, we follow Stein (1989) by suppressing the precise 
reasons underlying corporate myopia. We assume that the firm places weight k on the date 3 
firm value and 1 — k on the date 4 value. The variable k parameterizes the firm’s myopia, with 
higher values implying a greater concern for short-term share prices.
The twin assumptions of asymmetric information and corporate short-termism have been 
widely used in the financial economics literature. For example, Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Miller and Rock (1985) — who study capital structure and dividend policy, respectively — 
assume that shareholders care about short-run share prices, and that managerial compensa­
tion contracts induce managers (who actually make the capital structure and dividend policy 
decisions) to value high short-run share prices as well.
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This approach has been criticized by Dybvig and Zender (1991), who argue that shareholders 
need not write contracts that motivate managers to care about short-run share prices. Indeed, 
given that equilibria in these models typically involve inefficient investment, shareholders are 
best off writing contracts that give managers a different objective function than shareholders 
themselves hold; essentially, Dybvig and Zender offer delegation-as-commitment as a solution 
to a strategic problem, as in Fershtman and Judd (1987). The delegation-as-commitment 
literature has been criticized by Katz (1991), Persons (1994), and others on the grounds that 
such contracts are not renegotiation-proof. If secret renegotiation of contracts is possible, 
then delegation may be strategically irrelevant. Dewatripont (1988) counters this claim by 
noting that informational problems may impede renegotiation, thus restoring a strategic role 
for contracts.
We remain agnostic on this debate, for two reasons. First, our analysis differs from the cor­
porate finance literature in that it is the managerial wage contract itself — rather than a choice 
of capital structure or dividend policy which, in turn, is a function of the wage contract — 
that is affected by the information asymmetry and myopia. Thus, an appropriately constructed 
managerial incentive contract cannot help here. Second, the prescription of Dybvig and Zen­
der (1991) — that myopic shareholders should credibly delegate decisions to an intermediary 
whose preferences are manipulated using contracts — sounds very much like status quo insti­
tutional arrangements, where pay decisions are delegated to a subcommittee of the board. If 
current institutional arrangements do succeed in insulating compensation committee members 
from shareholder myopia, then pay will not be distorted upward relative to a full-information 
benchmark. In this case, we argue that our analysis remains relevant to the policy debate, 
particularly because of recent calls for more direct shareholder involvement in the pay process. 
We develop this point in more detail in Section 5.
3 Idiosyncratic M atching
In this section, we develop several variants of this basic model. We consider idiosyncratic 
matching, where the parties’ outside options are assumed to be equal to their individual-specific 
productivity parameters. We examine three cases, each corresponding to a different source of 
information asymmetry regarding firm value. First, we suppose that managerial ability a is 
unknown to stock market participants. Second, we assume that the informational asymmetry 
pertains to the match-specific productivity parameter 7 . Third, we assume that stock market
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participants are uninformed regarding the firm’s individual productivity q .
3.1 A sym m etric  In fo rm atio n  R eg ard in g  M anageria l A bility
We begin by considering the effects of asymmetric information regarding managerial ability. To 
focus on this effect, we make a number of assumptions. Let the firm’s individual productivity 
parameter q be common knowledge among all players of the game. Let the parties’ match payoff 
be f  (q, a), where the function f  is common knowledge and the match-specific productivity 
parameter 7  is suppressed. Finally, as noted above, we assume that the outside options of the 
firm and manager are given by q and a respectively.
Under these assumptions, the match surplus — that is, the difference between the parties’ 
payoff when working together and when pursuing their outside options — is given by
f  (q, a) -  q -  a.
If all players in the game can observe managerial ability a at date 1, then there is no reason for 
the firm to behave strategically to try to affect date 3 market values. We assume that in this 
case, the firm and manager split the match surplus according to Nash bargaining. Assuming 
the manager has bargaining power a, he will command a wage of
W(a) = a + a ( f  (q, a) — q — a). (1)
Let the wage schedule W(a) be a full-information benchmark.
Suppose, however, that a is observed by the firm and manager at date 1, but that market 
participants cannot learn a directly until date 4 when the firm’s terminal payoff is revealed. 
Given this, the firm may want to distort the manager’s pay upward in an attempt to affect 
outsiders’ short-run perceptions of firm value. In equilibrium, of course, such attempts to fool 
the market must fail, so a wage schedule that is part of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) 
must satisfy a no-mimic constraint.
A firm whose manager has ability a must not prefer to mimic a firm whose manager has 
ability a = a. Denoting the PBE wage schedule under asymmetric information as W(a), we see 
that a type-a firm’s date 3 value when mimicking a type-a firm is
f  (q, a) — W(a).
Note here that date 3 firm value can be increasing in the wage paid to the manager. Paying 
a higher wage can increase the market’s perception of the available match surplus, and thus
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increase value. Ordinarily, of course, higher factor prices reduce firm value, but this need not 
be the case given the information asymmetry here.
A type-a firm’s date 4 value when mimicking a type-a firm is
f  (q,a) — w(a).
The firm places weight k on its date 3 market valuation, so its payoff when mimicking a type-aa 
firm is given by
k(f (q,a) — w(a)) + ( 1  — k)(f(q, a) — w(a)).
If a type-a firm instead elects not to mimic a type-aa firm, then its date 3 and date 4 values are 
identical, and equal to
f  (q,a) — w(a).
Our no-mimic constraint is that wa must satisfy
f  (q, a) — w(a) > k (f (q, a) — w(a)) + ( 1  — k) (f  (q, a) — w(a)) (2 )
for all a = a.
To build intuition, note that there are both costs and benefits to a type-a firm mimicking a 
type-a firm, where a > a. As long as fa > 0 (where the subscript denotes a partial derivative), 
mimicking a higher type causes the firm’s date 3 market value to increase. The firm places 
weight k on this benefit. However, the firm must also increase the employee’s wage from w(a) 
to w(a) — this cost is felt both at date 3 and at date 4. Re-arranging, we see that the no-mimic 
constraint in (2 ) is equivalent to
w(a) — w(a) > k(f(q,a) — f(q,a)). (3)
Assuming f  is concave in a, we can replace (3) with a local no-mimic constraint, yielding
w ' > kfa (4)
for all a € [aL, aH].
Under what conditions can the full-information contract w(a) be part of a PBE? The full- 
information wage must increase sufficiently quickly with a to make it unattractive for firms to 
try to increase managerial pay to boost date 3 market value. Differentiating (1), we have
w' (a) = ( 1  — a) + af a.
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for all a. Because f  is concave in a, we have that if
( 1  -  a) + afa(aL) > kfa(aL),
then (5) holds for all a. Re-arranging, we have that if
1 a
k < a  + — — - (6 )
fa (a£)
then the full-information contract forms a PBE.
Inequality (6 ) leads to a number of observations. First, note that if fa(aL) — the marginal 
effect of managerial ability on match value — is less than or equal to one, then the full- 
information wage schedule is always part of a PBE. Because match surplus is given by f  (q, a) — 
q — a, boosting market perceptions of managerial ability has a positive effect on firm value 
only if fa > 1. If fa < 1, then a firm cannot increase market value by increasing the market’s 
perception of managerial ability. Firm-specificity of human capital is therefore a necessary 
condition for upward distortions in pay.
Second, when fa(aL) is sufficiently high, the full-information wage schedule cannot be part of 
a PBE. The marginal effect on firm value of an increase in the market’s perception of managerial 
ability is high when f a is high. This makes the firm’s temptation to overpay relative to the 
full-information wage schedule strong.
Third, higher k increases the firm’s temptation to increase pay to boost short run valuations, 
and thus the equilibrium moves away from the full-information benchmark as k increases. 
Fourth, higher a  moves the equilibrium in the direction of the full-information wage schedule. 
Higher a  means that a greater share of the match surplus is captured by the manager rather 
than the firm. This both increases the marginal cost and reduces the marginal benefit of 
attempts to boost the market’s perception of managerial ability. The marginal benefit falls 
because an increase in perceived match surplus has a smaller effect on date 3 firm value. The 
marginal cost rises because a larger wage increase is required to move market perceptions of 
managerial ability.
Next, we characterize the PBE when the full-information wage schedule cannot be part of 
an equilibrium. We begin by considering the case where
1 a
The full-information contract therefore satisfies (4) if
(1 -  a)  + a f a  >  kfa,  (5)
k > a  +
f a(aH )
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Here, the fact that fa is decreasing means that the full information wage schedule does not 
satisfy (6 ) for any a € [aL,aH]. We therefore derive the PBE contract using the differential 
equation in (4). (Here, we apply the standard refinement of minimal signaling.) For a boundary 
condition, we assert that every manager type must be paid as least as much under asymmetric 
information as under the full-information contract. Thus, our boundary condition is
W(aL) = W(aL)
= aL + a ( f  (q,aL) — q — aL).
We therefore have that for k > a  + (1 — a ) /f a(aH), the PBE wage schedule is the solution to
W = kfa
W(aL) = aL + a ( f  (q,aL) — q — aL).
Next, we consider the case where
1 —a 1 —aa + ——— - < k < a  +
fa(aL) fa(aH)
Here, the full-information wage schedule satisfies (6 ) for some but not all values of a. The PBE 
wage schedule in this case is given by
W(a) = max [W(a),W(a)],
where W(a) is the solution to the differential equation
w' = kfa
with boundary condition
W(aL) = aL + a ( f  (q, aL) — q — a ^ .
In this case, it is possible that pay is distorted upward relative to the full-information case for 
the low-ability managers, but not for high ability managers.
To illustrate the construction of our equilibria, we consider a simple numerical example. 
Assume f  (q, a) = 16^/qa, and let q = 1 be common knowledge. Let a € [1, 2]. If a  = 1/4, then 
the full-information wage schedule is given by
~ / , 16^/$ — a — 1  W(a) = a +-------------------.
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W a g e
Figure 2 : Solid line shows full-information wage schedule for f  (q,a) = 16^/qa, q = 1, a  = 1/4, 
and a € [1,2]. Dashed line is the PBE wage schedule for k = 2/5. Dot-dash line is the PBE 
wage schedule for k = 3/5. Dotted line is the PBE wage schedule for k = 4/5.
It is straightforward to verify that if k > (8+3\/2)/32 w 0.38, then the full-information contract 
cannot be part of a PBE. So, if for example k = 2/5, the PBE wage schedule is the function w 
that solves
16w =
This solves out to
, . 64J~a — 19 w(a) =
1 0
We plot both the full-information wage schedule w and the asymmetric information contract w 
(using various values for k) in Figure 2.
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Next, we consider the case where the information asymmetry pertains to a match-specific 
productivity parameter 7 .
To focus on this effect, we again make a number of assumptions to simplify notation and 
analysis. First, assume that both the manager’s and the firm’s individual-specific productivity 
parameters, a and q, are commonly known to all players as of date 1. Suppose, as above, that 
the outside options of the manager and firm are given by a and q, respectively. Next, suppose 
that the match value is given by f  (7 ), where 7  € [yl ,yh ]. Here, we have suppressed the role 
of the individual-specific productivity parameters in f . Because these parameters are common 
knowledge, it is necessary for us to consider only the role of 7  in determining the match value. 
Define, as above, the full-information wage schedule as
w(y  ) = a + a f  ( 7  ) — q — q).
To study the asymmetric-information case, assume that market participants cannot observe 
7  directly, but instead condition their beliefs regarding firm value on the observed wage payment 
to the manager. This raises the possibility that a firm may wish to increase the manager’s pay 
in an attempt to fool the market in to assigning it a high date 3 market value. Equilibrium 
requires that such attempts must fail, so a PBE wage schedule w must satisfy the following 
no-mimic constraint:
f  (7) — w(Y) > k( f  (7 ) — w(7)) + ( 1  — k) (f  (7) — w(7)) (7)
for all 7  = 7 . The cost to a type- 7  firm of mimicking a type- 7  (> 7) firm is that it must pay a 
higher wage; the benefit is a higher date 3 market value.
Assuming f  is concave in Y, we can replace (7) with a local no-mimic constraint, yielding 
the following constraint on equilibrium wage schedules:
w' > kfY
for all 7  € [yl ,7h].
Again we inquire about the conditions under which the full-information wage schedule can 
be part of a PBE. Differentiating w with respect to 7 , we have
w' (Y) = a f Y ■
3.2 A sym m etric Information Regarding M atch Quality
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Thus, the condition under which W is an equilibrium wage schedule takes an especially simple 
form. Specifically, if
k < a  (8 )
then W is a PBE wage schedule, and otherwise not. If k > a  , then the PBE wage schedule is 
given by the solution to
w' = kfY 
w(yl) = a + a ( f  (7 ) — q — a).
Comparing (8 ) to (6 ) above, we see that the values of a  and k where the full-information 
wage schedule is a PBE are not identical. In Figure 3, we place a  and k on the x and y axes, 
respectively, and depict the values for which the full-information contract is a PBE. The solid 
line is the inequality from (8 ), while the dashed line is the inequality from(6 ). Points below 
the solid (dashed) line are the (a, k) pairs for which the full-information wage schedule forms 
a PBE when the information asymmetry pertains to 7  (a). Clearly, the set of (a, k) values 
for which the manager’s wage is distorted upward relative to the full-information case is larger 
when the information asymmetry pertains to the match-specific productivity parameter 7  than 
when the information asymmetry pertains to the manager’s ability a.
To see the reason for this difference, suppose the information asymmetry pertains to 7 , and 
consider the effect on date 3 firm value when the firm pays the manager an additional dollar 
in wages. Paying one additional dollar in wages in the equilibrium action of a firm of type-7 , 
where 7a is defined by
a (f  (7) — f  (7)) = 1
Thus, a firm paying an additional dollar in wages is behaving as though its match surplus 
is higher by 1/a. Because the firm captures fraction 1 — a  of the match surplus, paying an 
additional dollar in wages increases the firm’s date 3 market value by (1 — a)/a .
Now suppose the information asymmetry pertains to managerial ability a, and again consider 
the effect on date 3 firm value when the firm pays the manager an additional dollar in wages. 
Paying one additional dollar in wages in the equilibrium action of a firm of type-aa, where aa is 
defined by
1  = a — a + a ( f  (q,a) + a — f  (q, a) — a)
= ( 1  — a)(a — a) + a ( f  (q, a) — f  (q,a)).
13
10.2 0 . 4 0.6 0 . 8
Figure 3: Let f  (q,a) = 16^/qa, a =  1/4, and q, a € [1, 2]. The solid line is the inequality 
from (8 ), while the dashed line is the inequality from (6 ) assuming q = 1. If the information 
asymmetry pertains to 7 , then the full-information wage schedule is a PBE for all (a, k) pairs in 
Region III. If the information asymmetry pertains to a, then the full-information wage schedule 
is a PBE for all (a, k) pairs in Regions II and III.
Here, because the information asymmetry pertains to the manager's ability and hence to his 
outside option, only part of the additional dollar in wages is attributed to an increase in the 
match surplus. As a result, a firm paying an additional dollar in wages is behaving as though 
its match surplus is higher, but by an amount strictly less than 1/a. Because the firm captures 
fraction 1  — a  of the match surplus, paying an additional dollar in wages increases the firm’s 
date 3 market value by an amount strictly less than (1 — a)/a .
Because the market attributes part of any increase in wages to an increase in the manager’s 
outside option and therefore not to an increase in the match surplus, the marginal effect of 
a wage increase on date 3 firm value is smaller when the information asymmetry pertains to 
managerial ability a rather than a match-specific productivity parameter 7 . Thus, the region
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of (a, k) for which the manager’s wage is distorted upward relative to the full-information case 
is larger when the information asymmetry pertains to 7 .
3.3 A sym m etric  In fo rm atio n  R eg ard in g  F irm  C h a rac te r is tic s
Finally, we consider the case where the information asymmetry pertains to the firm’s individual- 
specific productivity parameter q. Let the manager’s individual productivity parameter a be 
common knowledge among all players of the game. Let the parties’ match payoff be f(q, a), 
where the f  is common knowledge and the match-specific productivity parameter 7  is sup­
pressed. Define the full-information wage schedule as
W(q) = a + a ( f  (q, a) — q — q).
To study the asymmetric-information case, assume that market participants cannot observe 
q directly, but instead condition their beliefs regarding firm value on the observed wage payment 
to the manager. Given this, a PBE wage schedule must satisfy
f  (q, a) — W(q) > k (f  (q,a) — W(q)) + (1 — k)(f  (q) — ta(q))
for all q = q. Assuming f  is concave in q, we can replace this with a local no-mimic constraint, 
yielding the following constraint on equilibrium wage schedules:
W' > kfq
for all q € [qL,qH].
Again we inquire about the conditions under which the full-information wage schedule can 
be part of a PBE. Differentiating W with respect to q, we have
W'(q) = a(fq — 1).
So, if
kfq < a (fq — 1)
k < a ( 1  — f-)
Jq
for all q, then W can be part of a PBE. Concavity of f  means W can be part of a PBE if
k < 4  -  f i b )  • (9)
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The comparative statics of this case are similar, but not identical, to the case where the 
information asymmetry pertains to the manager’s ability. Specifically, the equilibrium wage
fq here are the reverse of those of fa above. If, for example, fq < 1, then the full-information 
contract can never be part of the PBE. Note that if fq < 1, then the full-information wage 
schedule is weakly decreasing in q. This occurs because the manager’s pay is a plus fraction a  of
large, the full-information wage schedule is part of a PBE. Higher fq means the manager’s full- 
information wage is increasing more rapidly with q, and so may satisfy the no-mimic constraint. 
Analyses of the cases where (9) does not hold is straightforward. If
In Figure 4, we update Figure 3 by denoting the set of (a, k) values for which the man­
ager’s wage is distorted upward when the information asymmetry pertains to the firm-specific 
productivity parameter q. Here, the region of upward-distorted pay is even larger.
To see why, consider the effect on date 3 firm value when the firm pays the manager an 
additional dollar in wages. Paying one additional dollar in wages in the equilibrium action of a 
firm of type-q, where q is defined by
schedule is weakly increasing in k and weakly decreasing in a . Notably, however, the effects of
the match surplus, and the match surplus is weakly decreasing in q. Further, for fq sufficiently
then the PBE wage schedule is the solution to
w' = kfq 
w(qL) = a + a f  (qL,a) — qL — a).
If
then define q* implicitly as
The PBE wage schedule is w for q < q* and is the solution to
w' = kfq
w (q*) w(q*)
if q >  q*.
a f  (q, a) — f  (q, a) — (q — q)) = 1 .
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aFigure 4: Let f  (q,a) = 16^qa, a  = 1/4, and q,a € [1, 2]. The solid line is Inequality (8 ), the 
dashed line is (6 ) assuming q = 1, and the dotted line is (9) assuming a = 1. If the information 
asymmetry pertains to q, then the full-information wage schedule is a PBE for all (a, k) pairs 
in Region IV.
A firm paying an additional dollar in wages is behaving as though its match surplus is higher 
by a . Note, however, that the increase in date 3 firm value is strictly larger than , because 
higher match surplus means a higher value of q. That is, by paying the manager more, the firm 
increases the market’s assessment of the match surplus. Because the only unknown affecting 
match surplus is the firm-specific productivity parameter q, an increase in match surplus means 
the firm’s outside option is higher as well. The marginal effect of a dollar of wages on date 3 
firm value is highest when the information asymmetry pertains to q, second highest when 7  is 
unknown, and lowest when a is unknown. This explains the pattern evident in Figure 4.
Before concluding this section, we briefly revisit the quotation from Edward S. Woolard, 
Jr. that we discussed in the introduction. Woolard indicates that increasing the manager’s pay 
helps make “the company look strong.” Notably, our analysis suggests that the temptation to
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overpay a manager to influence market beliefs are strongest when there is significant uncertainty 
regarding firm-specific productivity and weakest when there is significant uncertainty regarding 
managerial ability. Overpaying a manager to increase the market’s assessment of managerial 
ability has a small effect on firm value, because the market expects the gains from increases in 
managerial ability to be captured largely by the manager. Overpaying the a manager to increase 
the market’s assessment of some firm-specific element of productivity has a large effect on firm 
value, because the market expects the gains from increases in firm productivity to be captured 
largely by the firm. Woolard’s assertion that Wobegon Effects are mostly likely intended to 
make the company look strong — rather than making the manager look good — therefore fits 
with our findings.
4 Assortative M atching
Next, we embed our analysis in a simple model of assortative matching. Such models typically 
assume a complementarity between some firm characteristic (say, size) and managerial ability. 
The complementarity implies that the equilibrium assignment of managers to firm will involve 
sorting: the highest ability manager will be matched with the largest firm, second highest with 
second largest, and so on. Assortative matching models have been studied extensively by labor 
economists; see Sattinger (1993).
The advantage of this approach over that taken above is that it allows us to endogenize the 
parties’ outside options. The bargaining between, say, the largest firm and the ablest manager 
is framed by the possibility that the largest firm could hire the second best manager or the best 
manager could seek employment at the second largest firm.
We focus on the case where the manager’s ability a is unknown (as in Section 3.1), and 
adjust our notation somewhat. Specifically, let q» € [qL,qH] be a firm-specific characteristic 
that we interpret as firm i’s “size” and let aj € [aL,aH] (where i, j  € N) be a manager-specific 
characteristic we interpret as manager j ’s ability. Let the gross surplus arising from their match 
be given by f(q, a) where f  is increasing, concave, and supermodular.
We start by deriving the full-information equilibrium wages. Consider a setting with two 
firms and two managers, where a 1 > a 2  and q1 > q2. Given supermodularity of f , it is 
straightforward to show that the equilibrium assignment of managers to firms places manager 
1 with firm 1 and manager 2 with firm 2. We assume, as above, that each party has an option 
outside of this labor market equal in value to its individual-specific productivity parameter.
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That is, if manager j  (firm i) departs this market, he earns a payoff of aj (qi). Note that because 
firm 2 ’s value would be strictly higher if it could attract manager 1  rather than manager 2 , 
manager 1 ’s reservation value in its wage bargaining with firm 1  is endogenously determined 
by firm 1’s willingness to pay. Similarly, firm 1’s reservation value is endogenously determined 
by its value when hiring manager 2  away from firm 2 .
We derive these values by first considering firm 2 and manager 2. Here, the parties’ reserva­
tion values are determined by their options outside of this labor market. Again assuming that 
the manager captures fraction a  of the surplus, we have that manager 2 ’s wage when working 
for firm 2  is
w2 2  = a2 + a f  (q2,a 2) — q2  — a2) . (1 0 )
As above, we denote full-information wages as w. Firm 1’s profit when employing manager 1  is
n 2 2  = q2  + ( 1  — a) (f  (q2 , a2 ) — q2  — a ^ .
Things are more complex for the match between the first firm and the first manager. The 
reservation values here are determined endogenously — the first firm could bid for the second 
manager, and the first manager could work for the second firm. Specifically, note that firm 2 
would be willing to bid manager 1 ’s wage up to the point where firm 2  is indifferent between 
employing manager 2 and employing manager 1. Thus, the highest wage that firm 2 is willing 
to offer to manager 1  (call this w2i) is determined by
f  (q2, ai) — w2 i = f  (q2, a2 ) — w2 2 - 
Thus, the outside option for manager 1 in wage bargaining with firm 1 is
w2i = (f (q2 , ai) — f  (q2, a2)) + w22- 
Similarly, the reservation value for firm 1 in bargaining with manager 1 is
ni2  = (f (qi, a 2 ) — f  (q2, a2 )) + n 2 2  •
Thus, surplus in the firm 1/manager 1 match is given by
f  (qi, ai) — w2 i — ni2
which reduces to
f  (qi, ai) — f  (q2 , ai) — f  (qi, a2 ) + f  (q2 , a2 ).
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This quantity is positive, by the assumption of supermodularity of f . Again assuming the 
manager captures fraction a  of the surplus, we have
Wn = a ( f  (qi, ai) — W2 1  — 7fi^  + W21
= a f  (qi, ai) — f  (q2 , ai) — f  (qi, a2 ) + f  (q2 , a2 )) + f  (q2 , ai) — f  (q2 , a 2 ) + W2 2 - (1 1 )
The intuition here is that manager 1’s wage is equal to manager 2’s wage plus the full amount 
of value manager 1  would create at firm 2  over what manager 2  would create, plus fraction a  
of the match surplus at firm 1 .
Next, we consider how equilibrium wages are affected when market participants cannot 
directly observe the value of the firm, and instead attempt to infer it from the manager’s 
wage. We therefore merge our analysis of equilibrium wages under assortative matching with 
our model, from Section 3.1, of asymmetric information regarding managerial ability. (The 
analyses of settings where the asymmetry of information pertains to a match-specific or firm- 
specific parameter are similar.) Let ki be the weight placed on date 3 share price by firm i. 
Suppose qi and q2  and the function f  are common knowledge. Manager abilities ai and a 2  are 
commonly observed by the two firms and the two managers, but are not observed by market 
participants. We focus on equilibria where only wages, not the equilibrium matches, are affected 
by the firms’ myopia.
Within this framework, we establish three main results. First, we show that pay for manager 
1 is weakly increasing in the myopia of firm 2. Second, we show that firm 1 and firm 2 are 
equally myopic, then pay for manager 1  increases faster (weakly) with that common degree of 
myopia than does pay for manager 2. Third, we show that any upward distortions in pay for 
manager 1  are greater when qi and q2  are far apart.
To establish these results, note first that the analysis for firm 2 is identical to that in 
Section 3 above. We therefore have that the PBE wage schedule for manager 2 at firm 2 is
W2 2 (a2 ) = a2  + a ( f  (q2 , a2 ) — q2  — a 2 )
if
1  — a
k2  < a  + —- --------.
fa(q2 ,aL)
The PBE is the solution to
w2  2  = k2 fa(q2 ,a 2 )
w22(aL) = aL + a (f  (q2, aL) — q2 — aL) -
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1  — a k2  > a  + — ------- -.
fa (q2 ,aH )
Finally, if
1  — a  1  — a
a  + ;-------r < k2  < a  + ——------- -,
fa(q2 ,aL) fa (q2 ,aH)
then the PBE wage schedule is
W2 2 (a2 ) = max [^ 2 2 ^ 2 ), W2 2 (a2 )], 
where W(a2) is the solution to the differential equation
w2  2  = k2 fa(q2 ,a 2 )
with boundary condition
w22(aL) = aL + a (f  (q2, aL) — q2 — aL).
Now suppose k1 = 0, so there is no incentive for firm 1 to increase its manager’s wage to 
affect market perceptions of value. In this case, manager 1’s equilibrium wage schedule is given 
by
Wn (a 1 ) = a ( f  (q1 , a 1 ) — f  (q2 , a 1 ) — f  (q1 , a2 ) + f  (q2 , a 2 )) + f  (q2 , a 1 ) — f  (q2 , a 2 ) + W2 2 .
Thus, if k2  is such that W2 2  > W22, then Wn > Wn. The intuition for this result is straightfor­
ward. Firm 2’s myopia causes it to overpay manager 2 in a futile attempt to increase its date 
3 market value. This reduces firm 2’s profit when employing manager 2, and hence increases 
firm 2 ’s willingness to pay for manager 1 .
This observation leads immediately to our first two conclusions. For k1 = 0, we have that
dWn d W2 2  
d k2  d k2  ’
that is, Wn increases dollar-for-dollar with W22. For k1 > 0, it is possible that firm 1 attempts 
to increase manager 1’s pay to affect short-run market valuations. Thus, if k = k1 = k2, we 
have
dWn > dW2 2  
dk dk
To get our third result, we derive the firm 1 no-mimic constraint.
if
W' 1 > kfa(q1, a1)
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for all a i € [a2 ,aH]. Recall that we assume the equilibrium matches are not upset by the 
asymmetry of information. Because the market’s beliefs about the ability of the second manager 
(a2) are correct in equilibrium, the no-mimic constraint must hold only for values of ai > a2.
Under what conditions can the full-information contract w ii(ai) be part of a PBE? The 
full-information wage must increase sufficiently quickly with ai to make it unattractive for firms 
to try to increase managerial pay to boost date 3 market value. Differentiating (11), we have
w'ii(ai) = ( 1  — a)fa(q2, ai) + afa(qi ,ai).
The full-information contract therefore satisfies (4) if
( 1  — a)fa(q2, ai) + afa(qi ,ai) > kifa(qi,ai),  
for all a i € [a2, aH]. Re-arranging, we have that if
k < a  + ( 1  " ,f  (1 2 )
fa(qi,ai)
for all ai € [a2, aH]. then the full-information contract forms a PBE. Note that supermodularity 
implies that
f a(q2, a i) < 1  
fa(qi,ai) ’
so there are values for ki € [0,1] for which the inequality in 12 is not satisfied. Note also that 
this inequality is not satisfied when qi is sufficiently large compared to q2. Why? If qi and 
q2  are close together, the firm 1  and firm 2  are close substitutes as employers for manager 1 . 
Thus, an increase in manager 1’s ability doesn’t increase the match surplus with firm 1 as much 
as it increases manager 1’s outside option. An extra dollar paid to manager 1  therefore does 
increase the market’s assessment of managerial ability, but the firm is not assumed to capture 
much value as a result. Thus, if the information asymmetry pertains to managerial ability, then 
pay is distorted upward when employers are not good substitutes for each other.
5 Discussion
5.1 E m pirica l Im p lications
These results offer a possible explanation for one of the most persistent puzzles in the executive 
compensation literature. Why have pay levels in the US risen so much more quickly than 
those in other developed nations? Two leading explanations for the recent increases in US pay 
levels — corporate governance failures and increases in demand for CEO talent — would seem
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to predict no major across-country differences. Governance practices seemingly do not vary 
substantially across the developed world. Technological changes that increase the marginal 
return to ability would seem to affect firms equally across national boundaries.
Because pay increases in our model are triggered by information asymmetries in capital 
markets, our analysis suggests a link between characteristics of a nation’s capital markets and 
pay levels in its managerial labor market. In particular, our main result from Section 4 — that 
an increase in myopia or short-termism at a small firm leads to an increase in pay at a large 
firm — suggests that the presence of small public firms with a significant interest in boosting 
short-run market valuations can affect equilibrium pay levels at larger firms. If small US firms 
are more eager to affect short-run market valuations than similar firms in other nations, then 
our model may help explain cross-country pay patterns.
It is, of course, difficult to make cross-national comparisons of corporate myopia, but one 
approach may be to focus on the liquidity of equity markets. Illiquid equity markets may mean 
high trading costs and, presumably, low share turnover. If a firm’s shareholders face high costs 
associated with selling shares, then adjusting corporate policies to try to affect short-run share 
prices is likely to be less attractive. Butler et al. (2005) offer evidence that supports this line 
of reasoning; they show that investment banking fees associated with seasoned equity offerings 
are lower for firms with more liquid stock and attribute this to increased underwriting costs 
when shares are illiquid. If small US firms have significantly greater liquidity than small firms 
in, say, continental Europe, then the relative attractiveness of overpaying managers to influence 
short-run market perceptions may be greater in the US.
One empirical approach that we think is unlikely to produce a sensible test of our theory 
would be a firm-level, cross-sectional comparison of pay and some myopia measure within the 
US. Because, as we have shown, myopia at one firm can lead to higher pay at its labor-market 
competitors, it is not necessarily the case that pay will be higher at more myopic firms. Note 
in particular that our assortative matching model suggests that pay can be higher at the large 
firm even if the small firm is more myopic. Controlling for firm size addresses this problem only 
if size is the only firm characteristic that is relevant for matching.
5.2 Policy  Im p lications
One important assumption of our model is that the firm’s contract offer to the manager is 
affected by the firm’s myopia. Following the reasoning of Dybvig and Zender (1991), this 
suggests that the firm’s shareholders could benefit from delegating the job of contracting with
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the manager to a third party, and manipulating that third party’s preferences using incentive 
contracts. Specifically, a myopic firm finding itself in the position outlined in our model would 
benefit from hiring an agent, granting the agent equity that cannot be sold until our model’s date 
4, and then delegating the job of contracting with the manager to the agent. If the shareholders 
can credibly commit to this arrangement — and note that our discussion in Section 2 questions 
the credibility of such a commitment — then the manager’s wage schedule should equal the 
full-information benchmark for all levels of shareholder myopia.
Notice that this suggested solution looks quite a bit like existing institutional arrangements 
surrounding CEO pay. Pay decisions are delegated to a subcommittee of the board of directors. 
If compensation committee members are less myopic than shareholders, then this arrangement 
may be an efficient response to Lake Wobegon Effect pressures. Adjusting our model to fit this 
setting is straightforward. Consider myopic shareholders who hire an agent to contract with 
a manager. Re-interpret the model’s key myopia parameter, k, as the weight the agent places 
on firm’s date 3 share price. This k will depend on the agent’s own preferences, the contract 
given to the agent by the shareholders, and the extent to which the shareholders can credibly 
commit not to interfere in the pay process via renegotiation of the agent’s contract. The degree 
to which directors value high short-run share prices is an open question, but at least some 
observers believe that boards do prefer to take actions that make the company look strong.
More broadly, we think this discussion points out that current institutional arrangements 
— which have been sharply criticized by some who assert that agency problems underlie re­
cent CEO pay increases — may be an efficient response to informational problems in financial 
markets. If myopic shareholders currently succeed in delegating pay decisions to less-myopic 
directors, then forcing shareholders to take a more active role in determining pay could exacer­
bate the problems identified in our model. We therefore take our analysis as a cautionary tale: 
Unless economists can produce stronger evidence that intra-organizational agency problems 
rather then financial-market information asymmetries underlie recent CEO pay increases, then 
changes in SEC regulations or corporation law intended to give shareholders more direct power 
to determine CEO pay may do more harm than good.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have attempted to build an economic model of the Lake Wobegon Effect, 
whereby firms attempt to influence market perceptions of value by increasing managerial pay.
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Our model builds in three key assumptions. First, there must be asymmetric information 
regarding the manager’s ability to create value at the firm. Second, the pay package given to 
a manager must convey information about the manager’s ability to create value at the firm. 
Third, the firm must have some preference for favorably affecting outsiders’ perceptions of firm 
value.
Our main results are these: First, we show that when firms have a sufficiently strong 
preference for high-short-run share prices, managerial pay can be distorted upward relative to 
a full-information benchmark. If the firm has a very strong preference for high short-run share 
prices, or if the manager captures a small share of the match surplus under full information, then 
it is pay is distorted upward relative to the full-information case. Second, we find that upward 
distortions in pay are more likely when the information asymmetry pertains to characteristics 
of the firm rather than characteristics of the manager. When the manager’s ability is uncertain, 
increases in the manager’s pay do boost the market’s assessment of managerial ability; however, 
the manager — not the firm — captures rents associated with increases in managerial ability. 
Thus, the marginal increase in firm value associated with a dollar increase in managerial pay 
is low when the uncertainty pertains to a characteristic of the manager. Third, embedding our 
model in a simple model of assortative matching suggests that CEO pay at large firms can be 
affected by short-termism at small firms.
Our analysis suggests that the high relative growth rate of US CEO pay may be attributable 
in part to properties of US capital markets. If markets for equities of small US firms are more 
liquid than those of small firms in other developed counties, then the resulting temptation to 
overpay managers to affect short-run market values could affect pay at both small and large US 
firms. Our model also suggests that current institutional arrangements — where pay decisions 
are delegated to directors whose preferences may differ from those of shareholders — may arise 
as an efficient response to informational problems in financial markets.
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